General
Douglas Macarthur’s Farewell Address to Congress
April
19, 1951
Mr.
President, Mr. Speaker and distinguished members of the Congress:
I stand
on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride - humility in the
wake of those great architects of our history who have stood here before me,
pride in the reflection that this home of legislative debate represents human
liberty in the purest form yet devised.
Here
are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race.
I do
not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are
fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan considerations. They
must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to
prove sound and our future protected.
I
trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I
have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.
I
address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life,
with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country.
The
issues are global, and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one
sector oblivious to those of another is to court disaster for the whole. While
Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that
Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail
to have its impact upon the other.
There
are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that
we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism.
If a
potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter
his efforts. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in
one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease
or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining
our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.
Beyond
pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the
general areas of Asia...
While I
was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of
the Republic of Korea, that decision, from a military standpoint, proved a
sound one. As I say, it proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and
decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within
reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.
This
created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated
when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation
which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic
adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.
While
no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into
continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did
urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim
was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.
Apart
from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize the sanctuary protection
given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the
conduct of the war made necessary --
(1) The
intensification of our economic blockade against China.
(2) The
imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.
(3)
Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal area and of
Manchuria.
(4)
Removal of restrictions on the forces of the republic of China on Formosa, with
logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the
Chinese mainland.
For
entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces
committed to Korea and to bring hostilities to an end with the least possible
delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been
severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my
understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully
shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the
Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I
called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not
available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up
bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force
of some six hundred thousand men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the
China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and
if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the
command from the military standpoint forbade victory.
We
could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our
supply-line advantages were in balance with the supply-line disadvantages of
the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its
terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full
military potential.
I have
constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.
Efforts
have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a
warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth.
I know
war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I
have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both
friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international
disputes.
Indeed,
on the second day of September, 1945, just following the surrender of the
Japanese nation on the battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:
"Men
since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages
have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle
disputes between nations. From the very start workable methods were found in so
far as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an
instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful.
"Military
alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving
the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of
war now blocks out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will
not devise some greater and more equitable system, our Armageddon will be at
our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual
recrudescence, an improvement of human character that will synchronize with our
almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and
cultural developments of the past two thousand years. It must be of the spirit
if we are to save the flesh."
But
once war is forces upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every
available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not
prolonged indecision.
In war
there is no substitute for victory.
There
are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to
history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that
appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance
where this end has justified that means, where appeasement had led to more than
a sham peace.
Like
blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as
in blackmail, violence becomes the only alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of
me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer.
Some
may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China. Others,
to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is
already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not
necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more
likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other
potential is in its favor on a worldwide basis.
The
tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is
confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our
purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air
bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack
and devastation.
Of the
nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked
its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the
Korean people defies description. They have chosen to risk death rather than
slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific."
I have
just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can
report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.
It was
my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and
with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing
bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will
remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.
I am
closing my fifty-two years of military service. When I joined the army, even
before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes
and dreams.
The
world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West
Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember
the refrain of one of the most popular barracks ballads of that day which
proclaimed most proudly that old soldiers never die; they just fade away.
And
like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just
fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to
see that duty. Good-bye.