UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., May 27,1954.
Subject: Findings and recommendation of
the Personnel Security Board in the case of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer.
Mr. K. D. NICHOLS,
General Manager, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission,
1901 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington 25, D. C.
DEAR MR. NICHOLS: On December 23, 1953,
Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer was notified by letter that his security clearance
had been suspended. He was furnished a list of items of derogatory information
and was advised of his rights to a hearing under AEC procedures. On March 4,
1954, Dr. Oppenheimer requested that he be afforded a hearing. A hearing has
been conducted by the Board appointed by you for this purpose, and we submit
our findings and recommendation.
Dr. Ward V. Evans dissents from the
recommendation of the majority of the Board, and his minority report is
attached. He, specifically subscribes to the "Findings" of the
majority of the Board, and to a portion of the material entitled
"Significance of the Findings."
It must be understood that in our world
in which the survival of free institutions and of individual rights is at
stake, every person must in his own way be a guardian of the national security.
It also must be clear that, in the exercise of this stewardship, individuals
and institutions must protect, preserve, and defend those human values for
which we exist as a nation, as a government, and as a way of life.
The hard requirements of security, and
the assertion of freedoms, together thrust upon us a dilemma, not easily
resolved. In the present international situation, our security measures exist,
in the ultimate analysis, to protect our free institutions and traditions
against repressive totalitarianism and its inevitable denial of human values.
Thoughtful Americans find themselves uneasy, however, about those policies
which must be adopted and those actions which must be taken in the interests of
national security, and which at the same time pose a threat to our ideals. This
Board has been conscious of these conflicts, presenting as they do some of the
grave problems of our times, and has sought to consider them in an atmosphere
of decency and safety.
We share the hope that some day we may
return to happier times when our free institutions are not threatened and a
peaceful and just world order is not such a compelling principal preoccupation.
Then security will cease to be a central issue; man's conduct as a citizen will
be measured only in the terms of the requirements of our national society;
there will be no undue restraints upon freedom of mind and action; and loyalty
and security as concepts will cease to have restrictive implications.
This state of affairs seems not to be a
matter of early hope. As we meet the present peril, and seek to overcome it, we
must realize that at no time can the interests of the protection of all our
people be less than paramount to all other considerations. Indeed, action which
in some cases may seem to be a denial of the freedoms which our security
barriers are erected to protect, may rather be a fulfillment of these freedoms.
For, if in our zeal to protect our institutions against our measures to secure
them, we lay them open to destruction, we will have lost them all, and will
have gained only the empty satisfaction of a meaningless exercise.
We are acutely aware that in a very real
sense this case puts the security system of the United States on trial, both as
to procedures and as to substance. This notion has been strongly urged upon us
by those who recommended clearance for Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, and no doubt
a similar view is taken by those who feel he should not be cleared.
If we understand the two points of View,
they may be stated as follows: There are those who apprehend that our program
for security at this point in history consists of an uneasy mixture of fear,
prejudice, and arbitrary judgments. They feel that reason and fairness and
justice have abdicated and their places have been taken by hysteria and
repression. They, thus, believe that security procedures are necessarily
without probity and that national sanity and balance can be served only by a
finding in favor of the individual concerned. On the other hand, there is a
strong belief that in recent times our government has been less than unyielding
toward the problem of communism, and that loose and pliable attitudes regarding
loyalty and security have prevailed to the danger of our society and its
institutions. Thus, they feel that this proceeding presents the
unrelinquishable opportunity for a demonstration against communism, almost
regardless of the facts developed about the conduct and sympathies of Dr.
Oppenheimer.
We find ourselves in agreement with much
that underlies both points of view. We believe that the people of our country
can be reassured by this proceeding that it is possible to conduct an
investigation in calmness, in fairness, in disregard of public clamor and
private pressures, and with dignity. We believe that it has been demonstrated
that the Government can search its own soul and the soul of an individual whose
relationship to his Government is in question with full protection of the
rights and interests of both. We believe that loyalty and security can be
examined within the frameworks of the traditional and inviolable principles of
American justice.
The Board approached its task in the
spirit of inquiry, not that of a trial. The Board worked long and arduously. It
has heard 40 witnesses including Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer and compiled over
3,000 pages of testimony in addition to having read the same amount of file
material.
Dr. Oppenheimer has been represented by
counsel, usually four in number, at all times in the course of the proceedings.
He has confronted every witness appearing before the Board, with the privilege
of cross-examination. He is familiar with the contents of every relevant
document, which was made available to Board, except those which under
governmental necessity cannot be disclosed, such as reports of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. He has, in his own words, received patient and
courteous consideration at the hands of the Board. The Board has, in the words
of his chief counsel, displayed fairness in the conduct of the hearings. And,
finally, perhaps it should be said that the investigation has been conducted
under the auspices of the responsible agency which has the obligation of
decision.
As it considered substance, the Board
has allowed sympathetic consideration for the individual to go hand in hand
with an understanding of the necessities for a clear, realistic, and rugged
attitude toward subversion, possible subversion, or indeed broader implications
of security.
It was with all these considerations in
mind that we approached our task.
This proceeding is based upon the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946; upon the Atomic Energy Commission's published Security
Clearance Procedures, dated September 12, 1950; and Personnel Security
Clearance Criteria for Determining Eligibility, dated November 17, 1950; and
upon Executive Order No. 10450, dated April 27, 1953.
Subparagraphs (ii) and (iv) of section
10 (b) (5) (B) of the Atomic Energy Act provide that, except as authorized by
the Commission in case of emergency, no individual shall be employed by the
Commission until the Civil Service Commission or (in certain instances) the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have made an investigation and report to
the Commission on the "character, associations, and loyalty" of such
individual.
The AEC published Procedures provide,
among other things, for written notice to the individual (1) listing the items
of derogatory information and (2) explaining his rights (a) to reply in writing
to the information set forth in the Commission's letter, (b) to request a
hearing before a personnel security board, (c) to challenge the appointment of
the members of the Board for cause, (d) to be present for the duration of the
hearing, (e) to be represented by counsel of his own choosing, and (f) to
present evidence in his own behalf through witnesses, or by documents, or by
both. The Commission's Procedures further provide that in the event of a
recommendation for a denial of security clearance, the individual shall be
immediately notified of that fact and of his right to request a review of his
case by the AEC Personnel Security Review Board, with the right to submit a
brief to that Board before the case goes to the general manager for final
determination.
The AEC published Criteria establish the
uniform standards to be applied in determining eligibility for clearance. These
Criteria, which, of course, are binding on this Board, provide that it is the
responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission to determine whether the common
defense or security will be endangered by granting security clearance.
The Executive order requires the head of
each department and agency of the Government to establish and maintain within
his department or agency an effective program to insure that "the
employment and retention in employment of any civilian officer or employee
within the department or agency is clearly consistent with the interests of the
national security." The Executive order further provides that information
on this issue shall relate, but shall not be limited, to certain categories of
information set forth in the order.
In compliance with section 4.16 (c) of
the Commission's Security Clearance Procedures, the Board makes the following
specific findings as to the allegations contained in Mr. K. D. Nichols' letter
of December 23, 1953 to Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer:
1. It was reported that in 1940 you were
listed as a sponsor of the Friends of the Chinese People, an organization which
was characterized in 1944 by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a
Communist-front organization.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true.
Dr. Oppenheimer in his answer replied
that he had no recollection of the Friends of the Chinese People, or of what,
if any, his connection with this organization was. The Board had before it a
four-page pamphlet (undated) entitled, "American Friends of the Chinese
People." The fourth page contains a list of sponsors which includes
"Prof. J. R. Oppenheimer."
2. It was further reported that in 1940
your name was included on a letterhead of the American Committee for Democracy
and Intellectual Freedom as a member of its National Executive Committee. The
American Committee for Democracy and
Intellectual Freedom was characterized in 1942 by the House Committee on
Un-American Activities as a Communist-front which defended Communist teachers,
and in 1943 it was characterized as subversive and Un-American by a Special
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified before the
Board to having joined the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual
Freedom in 1937. He said that it then stood as a protest against what had
happened to intellectuals and professionals in Germany. The Board had before it
a letterhead of the "American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual
Freedom." The letterhead contains a printed list of the National Executive
Committee, which includes "Prof. J. R. Oppenheimer." Dr. Oppenheimer
testified that he supposed he accepted membership on this Executive Committee
although he did not meet with it.
Dr. Oppenheimer stated in his personnel
security questionnaire, which he executed on April 28, 1942, for the purpose of
obtaining a clearance for work on the atomic program, that he had joined the
"American Committee for Democratic Intellectual Freedom" in 1937 and
was still a member on the date the PSQ was executed. He testified that he did
not know how long after that be continued to be a member; that, in any event,
he was not active thereafter.
3. It was further reported that in 1938
you were a member of the Western Council of the Consumers Union. The Consumers
Union was cited in 1944 by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a
Communist-front headed by the Communist Arthur Kallet.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true.
Dr. Oppenheimer in his answer stated
that for perhaps a year he had been a member of the Western Council of the
Consumers Union. In his personnel security questionnaire, which he executed on
April 28, 1942, Dr. Oppenheimer stated that he had been a member of the
Consumers Union (Western) in 1938-39.
The Board had before it a photostat of a
four-page pamphlet (undated) entitled, "Western Consumers Union,"
containing a list of Western sponsors, which included the name "Dr. Robert
J. Oppenheimer-Internationally-known Physicist at the University of
California."
4. It was further reported that you
stated in 1943 that you were not a Communist, but had probably belonged to
every Communist-front organization on the west coast and had signed many
petitions in which Communists were interested.
The Board concludes that this statement
was made by Dr. Oppenheimer, and the Board had before it considerable evidence
indicating Dr. Oppenheimer's membership in, and association with,
Communist-front organizations and activities on the west coast. However, Dr.
Oppenheimer, in his answer, claimed that the quotation was not true and that if
he had said anything along the lines quoted, it was a half-jocular
overstatement.
The Board had before it a memorandum,
dated September 14, 1943, prepared by Lt. Col. John Lansdale, Jr., who was then
head of Security and Intelligence for the Manhattan District, which reported
"Oppenheimer categorically stated (to General Groves) that he himself was
not a Communist and never had been, but stated that he had probably belonged to
every Communist-front organization on the west coast and signed many petitions
concerning matters in which Communists were interested.
The Board also had before it a
transcript of an interview between Colonel Lansdale and Dr. Oppenheimer on
September 12, 1943, which reflected that Colonel Lansdale had asked Dr.
Oppenheimer, "You've probably belonged to every front organization on the
coast," to which Dr. Oppenheimer replied, "Just about." The
transcript further records that Dr. Oppenheimer also stated that he thought we
would have been considered at one time a fellow-traveler and that "my
association with these things was very brief and very intense."
Dr. Oppenheimer in his testimony defined
"fellow-traveler" as "someone who accepted part of the public
program of the Communist Party, who was willing to work with and associate with
Communists, but who was not a member of the party." He testified to having
been a fellow-traveler from late 1936 or early 1937, with his interest
beginning to taper off after 1939, and with very little interest after 1942. He
further stated that within the framework of his definition of a
fellow-traveler, he would not have considered himself as such after 1942.
He further stated that with respect to
things that the Communists were doing, in which he still had an interest, it
was not until 1946 that it was clear to him that he would not collaborate with
Communists no matter how much he sympathized with what they pretended to
represent.
5. It was reported that in 1943 and
previously you were intimately associated with Dr. Jean Tatlock, a member of
the Communist Party in San Francisco, and that Dr. Tatlock was partially
responsible for your association with Communist-front groups.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true.
Dr. Oppenheimer in his testimony before
this Board admitted having associated with Jean Tatlock from 1936 until 1943.
He stated that he saw her only rarely between 1939 and 1943, but admitted that
the association was intimate. He admitted having seen Jean Tatlock under most
intimate circumstances in June or July of 1943, during the time when he was
Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, and admitted that he knew she had been a
Communist and that there was not any reason for him to believe that she was not
at that time still a Communist. He named several Communists, Communist
functionaries or Communist sympathizers whom he had met through Jean Tatlock,
or as a result of his association with her.
6. It was reported that your wife,
Katherine Puening Oppenheimer, was formerly the wife of Joseph Dallet, a member
of the Communist Party, who was killed in Spain in 1937 fighting for the
Spanish Republican Army.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true.
Mrs. Oppenheimer testified that she was
married to Joseph Dallet from 1934 until he was killed in Spain, fighting for
the Spanish Republican Army in 1937.
Mrs. Oppenheimer admitted knowing that
Dallet was a member of the Communist Party and was actively engaging in
Communist Party activities.
7. It was further reported that during
the period of her association with Joseph Dallet, your wife became a member of
the Communist Party. The Communist Party has been designated by the Attorney
General as a subversive organization which seeks to alter the form of
government of the United States by unconstitutional means, within the purview
of Executive Order 9835 and Executive Order 10450.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true.
Mrs. Oppenheimer testified to having
been a member of the Communist Party from about 1934 to June 1936 and having
engaged in Communist Party activities in the Youngstown, Ohio, area.
8. It was reported that your brother
Frank Friedman Oppenheimer became a member of the Communist Party in 1936 and
has served as a party organizer and as educational director of the professional
section of the Communist Party in Los Angeles County.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true.
Dr. Frank Friedman Oppenheimer admitted
in testimony before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of
Representatives, on June 14, 1949, that he had been a member of the Communist
Party from about 1937 until the early spring of 1941. He testified that he
joined under the name of "Frank Folsom."
From information before it, the Board
concludes that Dr. Frank Oppenheimer had served as a party organizer and as
educational director of the professional section of the Communist Party in Los
Angeles County.
9. It was further reported that your
brother's wife, Jackie Oppenheimer, was a member of the Communist Party in
1938.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true.
Mrs. Jacquenette Oppenheimer in testimony
before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, on
June 14,1949, admitted having been a member of the Communist Party from 1937
until the spring of 1941.
10. and that in August, 1944, Jackie
Oppenheimer assisted in the organization of the East Bay branch of the
California Labor School.
On the basis of information before it,
the Board concludes that this allegation is true.
11. It was further reported that in 1945
Frank and Jackie Oppenheimer were invited to an informal reception at the
Russian Consulate, that this invitation was extended by the American-Russian
Institute of San Francisco and was for the purpose of introducing famous
American scientists to Russian scientists who were delegates to the United
Nations Conference on International Organization being held at San Francisco at
that time, and that Frank Oppenheimer accepted this invitation.
On the basis of information before it,
the Board concludes that this allegation is true.
12. It was further reported that Frank
Oppenheimer agreed to give a 6-week course on The Social Implications of Modern
Scientific Development at the California Labor School, beginning May 9, 1946,
The American Russian Institute of San Francisco and the California Labor School
have been cited by the Attorney General as Communist organizations within the,
purview of Executive Order 9835 and ExecutiveOrder 10450.
On the basis of information before it,
the Board concludes that this allegation is true.
13. It was reported that you have
associated with members and officials of the Communist Party, including Isaac
Folkoff, Steve Nelson, Rudy Lambert, Kenneth May, Jack Manley, and Thomas
Addis.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is substantially true.
Dr. Oppenheimer in his answer and in his
testimony admitted having associated with Isaac Folkoff, Steve Nelson, Rudy
Lambert, Kenneth May, and Thomas Addis. He testified that he knew at the time
of his association with them that Folkoff, Nelson, Lambert, and May were
Communist Party functionaries, and that Addis was either a Communist or close
to one. He admitted that his associations with these persons continued until
1942. There was no evidence before the Board with respect to an association
with Jack Manley.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that he made
contributions to the Spanish War and Spanish Relief through Isaac Folkoff and
Thomas Addis. He testified that he had seen Lambert on half a dozen occasions,
and that he discussed such contributions once or twice at luncheon with Lambert
and Folkoff.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that Steve
Nelson and his family visited his home on several occasions, the last being
probably in 1942; that such visits lasted "a few hours;" that he had
met Steve Nelson through his (Oppenheimer's) wife since Nelson had befriended
her in Paris at the time of Dallet's death; that he had nothing in common with
Nelson "except an affection for my wife."
14. It was reported that you were a
subscriber to the Daily People's World, a west coast Communist newspaper, in
1941 and 1942.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that he had
subscribed to the People's World "for several years." He could not
recall when the subscription expired and stated that he did not believe he had
canceled the subscription. He testified that he knew the Daily People's World
was the west coast Communist newspaper.
15. It was reported in 1950 that you
stated to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that you had in the
past made contributions to Communist-front organizations, although at file time
you did not know of Communist Party control or extent of infiltration of these
groups. You further stated to an agent of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation that
some of these contributions were made through Isaac Folkoff,
whom you knew to be a leading Communist
Party functionary, because you had been told that this was the most effective
and direct way of helping these groups.
The Board finds that Dr. Oppenheimer
made the statements attributed to him by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The Board concludes that Dr. Oppenheimer
in the past made contributions to Communist-front organizations and that some
of these contributions were made through Isaac Folkoff, a leading Communist
Party functionary.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that he
contributed to Spanish causes through Communist Party channels from the winter
of 1937-38 until early in 1942. He said that he had contributed more than $500
and less than $1,000 each year during this period. He testified that he had
made the contributions in cash and, in explaining how these contributions came
to an end, he said (in referring to Pearl Harbor) that he "didn't like to
continue a clandestine operation of any kind at a time when I saw myself with the
possibility or prospect of getting more deeply involved in the war."
Dr. Oppenheimer in his answer admitted
making the contributions through Thomas Addis and Isaac Folkoff. He testified
that he knew Addis was a Communist or very close to a Communist. He knew that
Folkoff was connected with the Communist Party. In addition, Dr. Oppenheimer
admitted having contributed about $100 in cash to the Strike fund of one of the
major strikes of "Bridges' Union" about 1937 or 1938.
16. It was reported that you attended a house-warming
party at the home of Kenneth and Ruth May on September 20, 1941, for which
there was an admission charge for the benefit of The Peoples World, and that at
this party you were in the company of Joseph W. Weinberg and Clarence Hiskey,
who were alleged to be members of the Communist Party and to have engaged in
espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. It was further reported that you
informed officials of the United States Department of Justice in 1942 that you
had no recollection that you had attended such a party, but that since it would
have been in character for you to have attended such a party, you would not
deny that you were there.
The Board concludes on the basis of
information before it, that it was probable that Dr. Oppenheimer attended
"the house-warming party" at the home of Kenneth and Ruth May. The
Board concludes that Dr. Oppenheimer made the statements to the United States
Department of Justice officials attributed to him.
Dr. Oppenheimer did not deny having
attended such a party and testified that he knew Kenneth May. He denied knowing
Hiskey but testified that he, Oppenheimer, was at parties at which Weinberg was
present.
17. It was reported that you attended a
closed meeting of the professional section of the Communist Party of Alameda
County, Calif., which was held in the latter part of July or early August 1941,
at your residence, 19 Kenilworth Court, Berkeley, Calif., for the purpose of
hearing an explanation of a change in Communist Party policy. It was further
reported that you denied that you attended such a meeting and that such a
meeting was held in your home.
The Board is of the opinion that the
evidence with respect to this meeting is inconclusive. The Board finds that Dr.
Oppenheimer did deny that he attended such a meeting and that such a meeting
was held in his home.
18. It was reported that you stated to
an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1950 that you attended a
meeting in 1940 or 1941, which may have taken place at the home of Haakon
Chevalier, which was addressed by William Schneiderman, whom you knew to be a
leading functionary of the Communist Party. In testimony in 1950 before the
California State Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, Haakon Chevalier
was identified as a member of the Communist Party in the San Francisco area in
the early 1940's.
The Board finds that Dr. Oppenheimer
made the statements attributed to him by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that on
December 1, 1940, he attended an evening meeting at the home of Haakon
Chevalier at which perhaps 20 people were present and at which William
Schneiderman, secretary of the Communist Party in California, gave a talk about
the Communist Party line. He testified that he thought that possibly Isaac
Folkoff, Dr. Addis, and Rudy Lambert were there.
He also testified that "after the
end of 1940" he attended a similar meeting at the home of Louise Bransten,
"a Communist sympathizer," at which some of the same people were
present and at which Schneiderman also spoke and expounded the Communist Party
line.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that sometime
between 1937 and 1939 as a guest he attended a Communist Party meeting at the
home of his brother, Frank.
19. It was reported that you have
consistently denied that you have ever been a member of the Communist Party. It
was further reported that you stated to a representative of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation in 1946 that you had a change of mind regarding the policies
and politics of the Soviet Union about the time of the signing of the
Soviet-German Pact in 1939. It was further reported that during 1950 you stated
to a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that you had never
attended a closed meeting of the Communist Party; and that at the time of the Russo-Finnish
War and the subsequent break between Germany and Russia in 1941, you realized
the Communist Party infiltration tactics into the alleged anti-Fascist groups
and became fed up with the whole thing and lost what little interest you had.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that he had
never been a member of the Communist Party. The Board finds that Dr.
Oppenheimer made the statements attributed to him by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
It was further reported, however, that:
19. (a) Prior to April 1942 you had
contributed $150 per month to the Communist Party in the San Francisco area,
and that the last such payment was apparently made in April 1942 immediately
before your entry into the atomic bomb project.
The Board concludes on the basis of testimony
and other information before it that Dr. Oppenheimer made periodic
contributions through Communist Party functionaries to the Communist Party in
the San Francisco area in amounts aggregating not less than $500 nor more than
$1,000 a year during a period of approximately 4 years ending in April 1942. As
of April 1942, Dr. Oppenheimer had been for several months participating in
Government atomic energy research activities. He executed a questionnaire for
Government clearance on April 28, 1942, and subsequently assumed full-time
duties with the atomic energy project.
19. (b) During the period 1942-45
various officials of the Communist Party, including Dr. Hannah Peters,
organizer of the Professional Section of the Communist Party, Alameda County,
Calif., Bernadette Doyle, secretary of the Alameda County Communist Party,
Steve Nelson, David Adelson, Paul Pinsky, Jack Manley, and Katrina Sandow, are
reported to have made statements indicating that you were then a member of the
Communist Party; that you could not be active in the party at that time; that
your name should be removed from the Party mailing list and not mentioned in
any way; that you had talked the atomic bomb question over with Party members
during this period; and that several years prior to 1945 you had told Steve
Nelson that the Army was working on an atomic bomb.
The Board finds that during the period
1942-45, Dr. Hannah Peters, Bernadette Doyle, Steve Nelson, Jack Manley, and
Katrina Sandow made statements indicating that Dr. Oppenheimer was then a
member of the Communist Party; and that the other statements attributed to
officials of the Communist Party in this allegation were made by one or more of
them. The Board does not find on the basis of information available to it that
such statements were made by David Adelsbn and Paul Pinsky.
19. (c) You stated in August of 1943
that you did not want anybody working for you on the project who was a member
of the Communist Party, since "one always had a question of divided
loyalty" and the discipline of the Communist Party was very severe and not
compatible with complete loyalty to the project. You further stated at that
time that you were referring only to present membership in the Communist Party
and not to people who had been members of the party. You stated further that
you knew several individuals then at Los Alamos who had been members of the
Communist Party. You did not, however, identify such former members of the
Communist Party to the appropriate authorities. It was also reported that during
the period 1942-45 you were responsible for the employment on the atomic bomb
project of individuals who were members of the Communist Party or closely
associated with activities of the Communist Party, including Giovanni Rossi
Lomanitz, Joseph W. Weinberg, David Bohm, Max Bernard Friedman, and David
Hawkins. In the case of Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz, you urged him to work on the
project, although you stated that you knew he had been very much of a
"Red" when he first came to the University of California and that you
emphasized to him that he must forego all political activity if he came on to
the project. In August 1943 you protested against the termination of his
deferment and requested that he be returned to the project after his entry into
the military service.
The Board concludes that Dr. Oppenheimer
did state in 1943 that he did not want anybody working for him on the project
who was a member of the Communist Party, since "one always had a question
of divided loyalty" and the discipline of the Communist Party was very
severe and not compatible with complete loyalty to the project. He further
stated at that time he was referring only to present membership in the
Communist Party and not to people who had been members of the party. He stated
further that he knew several individuals then at Los Alamos who had been
members of the Communist Party. He did not, however, identify such former
members of the Communist Party to the appropriate authorities.
The Board concludes that Dr. Oppenheimer
was responsible for the employment on the atom bomb project of Giovanni Rossi
Lomanitz at Berkeley and David Hawkins at Los Alamos.
The Board concludes that Dr. Oppenheimer
asked for the transfer of David Bohm to Los Alamos, although Bohm was closely
associated with the Communist Party. In his answer, Dr. Oppenheimer admitted
that while at Berkeley he had assigned David Bohm to a problem of basic science
having a bearing on atomic research.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that he
understood that Hawkins had left-wing associations; and that Hawkins
"talked about philosophy in a way that indicated an interest and
understanding and limited approval anyway of Engels."
The Board does not conclude that Dr.
Oppenheimer was responsible for the employment of Friedmann or Weinberg on the
atomic energy program.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that Joseph W.
Weinberg was a graduate student of his; that he had heard that Weinberg had
been a member of the Young Communist League before coming to Berkeley and the
Board had before it a transcript of a conversation with Dr. Oppenheimer
indicating that at least by August 1943, he knew Weinberg to be a member of.
the Communist Party and that he "suspected that before but was not
sure." Weinberg gave Oppenheimer as a reference at the time he (Weinberg)
obtained employment at the Radiation Laboratory on April 22, 1943.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that he asked
General Groves for the transfer of David Bohm to Los Alamos in 1943, but was
told by General Groves that he could not be transferred since he had relatives
in Nazi Germany. In March 1944 after a conversation with Bohm at Berkeley (a
surveillance report indicated that the talk took place at a sidewalk meeting),
he checked with the security officer at Los Alamos to see whether the
objections to Bohm still obtained.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that he
thought that in 1946 or 1947 he helped Bohm get a job as Assistant Professor of
Physics at Princeton. He testified that he happened to meet Bohm and Lomanitz
on the street in Princeton in 1949 just prior to their testifying before the
House Committee on Un-American Activities; that he said that "they should
tell the truth"; that he later saw Bohm at Princeton and attended a
farewell party for him in Princeton; that he would, if asked, have written a
letter of recommendation for Bohm as a competent physicist in connection with a
job in Brazil, although he knew and was worried about Bohm having pleaded the
Fifth Amendment when he testified.
The Board finds that Dr. Oppenheimer did
urge Lomanitz to work on the project although he knew he had been very much a
"Red" when he first came to the University of California and, in
fact, during his attendance at the University, and that Dr. Oppenheimer later
stated to a Manhattan District official that he had warned Lomanitz that he must
forego all political activity if he came to the project. The Board finds
further that in August 1943, Dr. Oppenheimer protested against the termination
of Lomanitz' deferment and urgently requested that he be returned to the
project after his entry into the military service. It appears from the
testimony that Dr. Oppenheimer first learned of the impending induction of
Lomanitz in a letter from Dr. E. U. Condon who wrote to him "About it in a
great sense of outrage."
20. It was reported that you stated to
representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on September 5, 1946,
that you had attended a meeting in the East Bay and a meeting in San Francisco
at which there were present persons definitely identified with the Communist
Party. When asked the purpose of the East Bay meeting and the identity of those
in attendance, you declined to answer on the ground that this had no bearing on
the matter of interest being discussed.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true. The Board finds that Dr. Oppenheimer did attend a meeting in the East
Bay and a meeting in San Francisco (see item 18 above) at which there were
present persons definitely identified with the Communist Party and that when he
was asked about this meeting by representatives of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation on September 5, 1946, he declined to answer on the ground that
this had no bearing on the matter of interest being discussed.
The Board finds that Dr. Oppenheimer
advised representatives of the FBI of this meeting in a subsequent interview in
1950.
21. It was reported that you attended a
meeting at the home of Frank Oppenheimer on January 1, 1946, with David Adelson
and Paul Pinsky, both of whom were members of the Communist Party. It was
further reported that you analyzed some material which Pinsky hoped to take up
with the Legislative Convention in Sacramento, Calif.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true.
22. It was reported in 1946 that you
were listed as vice chairman on the letterhead of the Independent Citizens Committee
of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, Inc., which has been cited as a
Communist-front by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is true, although the Board finds that Dr. Oppenheimer advised the organization
in a letter on October 11, 1946, that he was not in accord with its policy and
wished to resign. He wrote again on December 2, 1946, insisting upon
resignation. The resignation was accepted on December 10, 1946.
23. It was reported that prior to March
1, 1943 possibly 3 months prior, Peter Ivanov, secretary at the Soviet
Consulate, San Francisco, approached George Charles Eltenton for the purpose of
obtaining information regarding work being done at the Radiation Laboratory for
the use of Soviet scientists; that George Charles Eltenton subsequently
requested Haakon Chevalier to approach you concerning this matter; that Haakon
Chevalier thereupon approached you, either directly or through your brother,
Frank Friedman Oppenheimer, in connection with this matter; and that Haakon
Chevalier finally advised George Charles Eltenton that there was no chance
whatsoever of obtaining the information. It was further reported that you did
not report this episode to the appropriate authorities until several months
after its occurrence; that when you initially discussed this matter with the
appropriate authorities on August 26, 1943, you did not identify yourself as
the person who had been approached, and you refused to identify Haakon
Chevalier as the individual who had made the approach on behalf of George
Charles Eltenton; and that it was not until several months later, when you were
ordered by a superior to do so, that you so identified Haakon Chevalier. It was
further reported that upon your return to Berkeley following your separation
from the Los Alamos project, you were 'visited by the Chevaliers on several
occasions; and that your wife was in contact with Haakon and Barbara Chevalier
in 1946 and 1947.
The Board concludes that this allegation
is substantially true.
The Board had before it a recording of a
conversation between Dr. Oppenheimer and Lt. Col. Boris T. Pash, War Department
intelligence officer, who had the responsibility for investigating subversive
activities at the Radiation Laboratory, University of California at Berkeley.
This conversation took place on August 26, 1943, at the Radiation Laboratory.
It was on this occasion that Dr.
Oppenheimer reported the incident to Government authorities. He named Eltenton
but refused to identify Chevalier. He also stated that the unnamed contact
(Chevalier) had approached three persons on the atomic project and in the
course of the interview mentioned other factors, such as the use of microfilm
or other means and the involvement of the Russian Consulate.
The Board also had before it a
transcript of a conversation between Dr. Oppenheimer and Lieutenant Colonel
Lansdale which records that on September 12, 1943, Dr. Oppenheimer again
refused to name Chevalier but reported the involvement of three others.
It was not until December 1943, that Dr.
Oppenheimer, after being told by General Groves that he would be ordered to
divulge the identity of the contact, reported the name of Chevalier. However,
the record shows that having been told of the identity of Chevalier by Dr.
Oppenheimer, the Manhattan District officials were still of the opinion that
Chevalier had contacted three employees on the atomic project.
Dr. Oppenheimer, in his answer, stated
that his friend, Haakon Chevalier, with his wife, visited him at his home on
Eagle Hill probably in early 1943. He stated further that during the visit
Chevalier came into the kitchen and told him that George Eltenton had spoken to
him of the possibility of transmitting technical information to Soviet
scientists. Dr. Oppenheimer said that he made some strong remark to the effect
that this sounded terribly wrong to him, and the discussion ended there.
Dr. Oppenheimer's answer further states
that nothing in his long-standing friendship would have led him to believe that
Chevalier was actually seeking information, and he was certain that Chevalier
had no idea of the work on which Dr. Oppenheimer was engaged.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that the
detailed story of the Chevalier incident which he told to Colonel Pash on
August 26, 1943, and affirmed to Colonel Lansdale on September 12, 1943, was
false in certain material respects. 'Dr. Oppenheimer testified that this story
was "a cock-and-bull story"; that "the whole thing was a pure
fabrication except for the one name, Eltenton." He said that his only
explanation for lying was that he "was an idiot" and he "was
reluctant to mention Chevalier" and "no doubt somewhat reluctant to
mention myself." He admitted on cross examination, however, that if the
story he told Colonel Pash had been true, it would have shown that Chevalier
"was deeply involved"; that it was not just a casual conversation;
that Chevalier was not an innocent contact, and that it was a criminal
conspiracy.
Dr. Oppenheimer admitted that if this
story to Colonel Pash had been true, it made things look very bad for both
Chevalier and himself. He acknowledged that he thought the request for
information by Eltenton was "treasonable." He admitted that he knew
when he talked to Colonel Pash that his falsification impeded Colonel Pash's
investigation.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that in June
or July of 1946 shortly after Chevalier was interviewed by the FBI about the
Eltenton-Chevalier Incident, Chevalier came to Oppenheimer's home in Berkeley
and told Oppenheimer about the interview; that Chevalier said the FBI had
pressed him about whether he talked to anyone besides Oppenheimer; that quite
awhile later Dr. Oppenheimer was interviewed by the FBI about the same matter,
and at this time he knew from Chevalier substantially what Chevalier had said
to the FBI about the incident.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that he
recalled getting a letter from Chevalier in 1950 asking him about Dr.
Oppenheimer's testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee
concerning the Chevalier-Eltenton incident. He responded, giving Chevalier a
summary of what he, Dr. Oppenheimer, had testified. This letter was later used
by Chevalier in support of his application for a passport. Dr. Oppenheimer
further testified that at about that time, Chevalier came to Princeton and
spent 2 days with Dr. Oppenheimer, discussing Chevalier's personal affairs and
that he also then mentioned the matter of his passport. Dr. Oppenheimer said
that on this occasion he recommended to Chevalier a lawyer named Joseph Fanelli,
who, cross examination disclosed, was the attorney who represented Joseph
Weinberg at his trial for perjury. Dr. Oppenheimer testified that he did not
know Mr. Fanelli at this time but he had represented Frank Oppenheimer at his
appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified further that
in December of 1953, when he and Mrs. Oppenheimer were in Paris, they had
dinner with Dr. and Mrs. Chevalier and, on the following day, went with the
Chevaliers to visit a Dr. Malraux. According to Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Malraux
had given a speech at a "Spanish Relief" meeting in California at
which Chevalier presided in about 1938. Dr. Oppenheimer said that since that
time, Malraux had undergone "rather major political changes"; that
"Malraux became a violent supporter of DeGaulle and his great brainman and
deserted politics and went into purely philosophic and literary work." It
appears also that subsequent to his meeting with Dr. Oppenheimer in Paris in
December 1953, Chevalier wrote a letter to an official of the United States
Embassy in Paris, reading as follows:
"My friend-and yours-Robert
Oppenheimer, gave me your name when he was up for dinner here in our apartment
early last December, and urged me to get in touch with you if a personal
problem of mine which I discussed with him became pressing. He gave me to
understand that I could speak to you with the same frankness and fullness as I
have with him, and he with me, during the 15 years of our friendship.
"I should not have presumed to
follow up such a suggestion if it had come from anyone else. But, as you know,
Opje never tosses off such a suggestion lightly.
"If you are in Paris, or will be in
the near future, I should, then, like to see you informally and discuss the
problem.
"On rereading what I have written,
I have a feeling that I have made the thing sound more formidable than it
really is. It's just a decision that I have to make, which is fairly important
to me, and which Opje in his grandfatherly way suggested that I shouldn't make
before consulting you.
"Very sincerely,
"HAAKON
CHEVALIER."
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that the
problem which was bothering Chevalier and his wife was that Chevalier was
employed as a translator for UNESCO, and he understood that if he continued
this work as an American citizen, he would have to be cleared after
investigation, and he was doubtful as to whether he would be cleared. He did
not wish to renounce his American citizenship but did wish to keep his job, and
he was in a conflict about it. Dr. Oppenheimer in his testimony denied going to
the American Embassy to assist Dr. Chevalier in getting a passport to return to
the United States although he admitted having had lunch with the official in
question.
Dr. Oppenheimer also denied discussing
with the official in question or anyone else the matter of Chevalier's
passport.
Dr. Oppenheimer in his testimony has
stated that his association with Chevalier has continued and that he still
considers him to be his friend.
24. It was reported that in 1945 you
expressed the view that "there is a reasonable possibility that it (the
hydrogen bomb) can be made," but that the feasibility of the hydrogen bomb
did not appear, on theoretical grounds, as certain as the fission bomb appeared
certain, on theoretical grounds, when the Los Alamos Laboratory was started;
and that in the autumn of 1949 the General Advisory Committee expressed the
view that "an imaginative and concerted attack on the problem has a better
than even chance of producing the weapon within 5 years." It was further
reported that in the autumn of 1949, and subsequently, you strongly opposed the
development of the hydrogen bomb: (1) on moral grounds, (2) by claiming that it
was not feasible, (3) by claiming that there were insufficient facilities and
scientific personnel to carry on the development, and 4) that it was not
politically desirable. It was further reported that even after it was
determined, as a matter of national policy, to proceed with development of a
hydrogen bomb, You continued to oppose the project and declined to cooperate
fully in the project. It was further reported you departed from your proper
role as an adviser to the Commission by causing the distribution, separately
and in private, to top personnel at Los Alamos of the majority and minority
reports of the General Advisory Committee on development of the hydrogen bomb
for the purpose of trying to turn such top personnel against the development of
the hydrogen bomb. It was further reported that you were instrumental in persuading
other outstanding scientists not to work on the hydrogen bomb project, and that
the opposition to the hydrogen bomb, of which you are most experienced, most
powerful, and most effective member, has definitely slowed down its
development.
In order to assess the influence of Dr.
Oppenheimer on the thermonuclear program, it has been necessary for the Board
not only to consider the testimony but also to examine many documents and
records, most of which are classified. Without disclosing the contents of classified
documents, the Board makes the following findings, which it believes to be a
sufficient reference to this allegation.
The Board confirms that in 1945 Mr.
Oppenheimer expressed the view that there is reasonable possibility that it
(the hydrogen bomb) can be made, but that the feasibility of the hydrogen bomb
did not appear, on theoretical grounds, as certain as the fission bomb appeared
certain, on theoretical grounds, when the Los Alamos Laboratory was started;
and that in August of 1949, the General Advisory Committee expressed the view
that 'an imaginative and concerted attack on the problem has a better than even
chance of producing the weapon within 5 years.'"
With respect to Dr. Oppenheimer's
attitude and activities in relation to the hydrogen bomb in World War II, the
evidence shows that Dr. Oppenheimer during this period had no misgivings about
a program looking to thermonuclear development and, indeed, during the latter
part of the war, he recorded his support of prompt and vigorous action in this
connection. When asked under cross examination whether he would have opposed
dropping an H-bomb on Hiroshima, he replied that "It would make no
sense," and when asked "Why?" replied, "The target is too
small." He testified further under cross examination that he believed he
would have opposed the dropping of an H-bomb on Japan because of moral scruples
although he did not oppose the dropping of an A-bomb on the same grounds.
During the postwar period, Dr. Oppenheimer favored, and in fact urged, continued
research in the thermonuclear field and seemed to express considerable interest
in results that were from time to time discussed with him. However, he was
aware that the efforts being put forth in this endeavor were relatively meager
and he knew that if research were continued at the same pace, there would be
little likelihood of success for many years. Testimony in this connection
indicated that there was a feeling on his part that it was more important to go
forward with a program for the production of a wider range of atomic bombs.
The Board finds further that in the
autumn of 1949, and subsequently, Dr. Oppenheimer strongly opposed the
development of the hydrogen bomb on moral grounds; on grounds that it was not
politically desirable: he expressed the view that there were insufficient
facilities and scientific personnel to carry on the development without
seriously interfering with the orderly development of the program for fission
bombs; and until the late spring of 1951, he questioned the feasibility of the
hydrogen bomb efforts then in progress.
Dr. Oppenheimer testified that what he
was opposing in the fall of 1949 was only a "crash program" in the
development and production of thermonuclear weapons. In this connection, Dr.
Oppenheimer contended that the main question relating to thermonuclear weapons
presented to the GAC at its meeting of October 29, 1949, was whether or not the
United States should undertake such a crash program. The Board does not believe
that Dr. Oppenheimer was entirely candid with the Board in attempting to
establish this impression. The record reflects that Dr. Oppenheimer expressed
the opinion in writing that the "super bomb should never be
produced," and that the commitment to this effect should be unqualified.
Moreover, the alternatives available to the GAC were not a choice between an
"all-out effort" and no effort at all; there was a middle course
which might have been considered.
The Board further concludes that after
it was determined, as a matter of national policy (January 31, 1950) to proceed
with development of a hydrogen bomb, Dr. Oppenheimer did not oppose the project
in a positive or open manner, nor did he decline to cooperate in the project.
However, Dr. Oppenheimer is recognized in scientific circles as one of the
foremost leaders in the atomic energy field and he has considerable influence
on the "policy direction" of the atomic program. The Board finds that
his views in opposition to the development of the H-bomb as expressed in 1949
became widely known among scientists, and since he did not make it known that
he had abandoned these views, his attitude undoubtedly had an adverse effect on
recruitment of scientists and the progress of the scientific effort in this
field. In other words, the Board finds, that if Dr. Oppenheimer had
enthusiastically supported the thermonuclear program either before or after the
determination of national policy, the H-bomb project would have been pursued
with considerably more vigor, thus increasing the possibility of earlier success
in this field.
The Board finds that Dr. Oppenheimer was
not responsible for the distribution, separately and in private, to top
personnel at Los Alamos of the majority and minority reports of the General
Advisory Committee on development of the hydrogen bomb, but that such
distribution was made on the direction of the then general manager of the
Atomic Energy Commission, Carroll L. Wilson, apparently in order to prepare the
personnel at Los Alamos to discuss the matter with the chairman of the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy of the Congress.
The Board does not find that Dr.
Oppenheimer urged other scientists not to work on the program. However,
enthusiastic support on his part would perhaps have encouraged other leading
scientists to work on the program.
Because of technical questions involved,
the Board is unable to make a categorical finding as to whether the opposition
of the hydrogen bomb "has definitely slowed down its development."
The Board concludes that the opposition to the H-bomb by many persons connected
with the atomic energy program, of which Dr. Oppenheimer was the "most
experienced, most powerful, and most effective member" did delay the
initiation of concerted effort which led to the development of a thermonuclear
weapon.
We do not believe that our findings with
respect to the letter of notification provide a full and automatic answer to
the categorical question posed to us in these proceedings. Only the dimensions
of the problem have perhaps been defined. On the one hand, we find no evidence
of disloyalty. Indeed, we have before us much responsible and positive evidence
of the loyalty and love of country of the individual concerned. On the other
hand, we do not believe that it has been demonstrated that Dr. Oppenheimer has
been blameless in the matter of conduct, character, and association.
We could in good conscience, we believe,
conclude our difficult undertaking by a brief, clear, and conclusive
recommendation to the general manager of the Commission in the following terms:
There can be no tampering with the national security, which in times of peril
must be absolute, and without concessions for reasons of admiration, gratitude,
reward, sympathy, or charity. Any doubts whatsoever must be resolved in favor
of the national security. The material and evidence presented to this Board
leave reasonable doubts with respect to the individual concerned. We,
therefore, do not recommend reinstatement of clearance.
It seemed to us that an alternative
recommendation would be possible, if we were allowed to exercise mature
practical judgment without the rigid circumscription of regulations and
criteria established for us.
In good sense, it could be recommended
that Dr. Oppenheimer simply not be used as a consultant, and that therefore
there exists no need for a categorical answer to the difficult question posed
by the regulations, since there would be no need for access to classified
material.
The Board would prefer to report a
finding of this nature. We have had a desire to reconcile the hard requirements
of security with the compelling urge to avoid harm to a talented citizen.
The Board questioned why the Commission
chose to revoke Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance and did not follow the alternative
course of declining to make use of his services, assuming it had serious
questions in the area of security. To many, this would seem the preferable line
of action. We think that the answer of the Commission to this question is
pertinent to this recital. It seemed clear that other agencies of Government
were extending clearance to Dr. Oppenheimer on the strength of AEC clearance,
which in many quarters is supposed to be an approval of the highest order.
Furthermore, it was explained that without the positive act of withdrawal of access,
he would continue to receive classified reports on Atomic Energy activities as
a consultant, even though his services were not specifically and currently
engaged. Finally it is said that were his clearance continued, his services
would be available to, and probably would be used by, AEC contractors. It is
noted that most AEC work is carried on by contractors. Withdrawal of clearance
and Dr. Oppenheimer's request for a hearing precipitated this proceeding.
In view of the fact that we must address
ourselves to security, we feel constrained to examine some of the great issues
and problems brought into focus by the case. Many of these are perhaps more
important than the outcome of this inquiry. We believe their examination is a
necessary precondition to its disposition on security grounds.
What, within the framework of this case,
is meant by loyalty?
Because of widespread confusions and
misapprehensions about the security system of the United States, the Board
feels that it must state some considerations with respect to loyalty. If a
person is considered a security risk in terms of loyalty, the fact or
possibility of active disloyalty is assumed, which would involve conduct giving
some sort of aid and comfort to a foreign power. The Communist Party is an international
conspiracy organized in support of the Soviet Union. It should then be clear
that (1) a member of the Communist Party is automatically barred from a
position of trust with the United States Government; (2) a fellow-traveler must
be declared ineligible for such a position of trust-such a person being
described as one who perhaps may not be subject to party discipline, but who is
sufficiently close to the party, or sympathetic with its aims, purposes and
methods that danger inheres in the situation; (3) any person whose absolute
loyalty to the United States is in question, aside from present or former
Communist affiliations or associations, should be rejected for Government
service; (4) a person whose former status would be encompassed in (1), (2), or
(3) above, has the burden of proof of change in position and attitude which
must be so clearly borne by him as to leave no reasonable doubt in the minds of
those who are called upon to make a governmental decision in the case. If he
fails in this demonstration, he must be considered a security risk and denied
access to classified information.
One of the important issues presented in
cases of this sort is that of rehabilitation
Stated in the context of this
proceeding, must we accept the principle that once a Communist, always a
Communist, once a fellow-traveler, always a fellow-traveler? Can an individual
who has been a member of the Communist Party, or closely enough associated with
it to make the difference unimportant at a later time, so comport himself
personally, so clearly have demonstrated a renunciation of interest and
sympathy, so unequivocally have displayed a zeal for his country and its
security as to overcome the necessary presumptions of security risk? We, as a
Board, firmly believe that this can be the case, and, if we may be permitted
something in the nature of a dictum, we believe that this principle should be a
part of the security policy of the United States Government. The necessary but
harsh requirements of security should not deny a man the right to have made a
mistake, if its recurrence is so remote a possibility as to permit a
comfortable prediction as to the sanity and correctness of future conduct.
This Board has been conscious of the
atmosphere of the time in which Dr. Oppenheimer's clear-cut Communist
affiliations occurred. We have considered his activities against the background
of the pervasive disillusionment among many of our people arising out of the
effects of the great depression and the perhaps normal tendency of a humanitarian
to turn to an organization which seemed to him to be espousing primarily
humanitarian causes. We recognize what may have seemed to be at the time a
beckoning towards a better social order. We know that many academic people and
other intellectuals, honest and moral though they were, misinterpreted the
talk, aims and purposes of the Communist Party and its affiliated
organizations. We are aware that the fact that the Soviet Union was an ally
during some of those years cannot be overlooked. This intellectual exercise
has, we think, not been inappropriate because we recognize that 1943 conduct
cannot be judged solely in the light of 1954 conditions. At the same time, it
must be remembered that standards and procedures of 1943 should not be
controlling today.
Another vital question is, can an
individual be loyal to the United States and, nevertheless, be considered a
security risk?
Because the security interests of this
country may be endangered by involuntary act, as well as by positive conduct of
a disloyal nature, personal weaknesses of an individual may constitute him a
security risk. These would include inordinate use of alcohol or drugs, personal
indiscretion (in the sense of careless talk), homosexuality, emotional
instability, tendency to yield to pressures of others, unusual attachment for
foreign systems. The presence of any of these items would support a finding of
security risk, even though in every case accompanied by a deep love of country.
There remains also an aspect of the
security system which perhaps has had insufficient public attention. This is
the protection and support of the entire system itself. It must include an
understanding and an acceptance of security measures adopted by responsible
Government agencies. It must include an active cooperation with all agencies of
Government properly and reasonably concerned with the security of our country.
It must involve a subordination of personal judgment as to the security status
of an individual as against a professional judgment in the light of standards
and procedures when they have been clearly established by appropriate process.
It must entail a wholehearted commitment to the preservation of the security
system and the avoidance of conduct tending to confuse or obstruct.
The Board would assert the right of any
citizen to be in disagreement with security measures and any other expressed
policies of Government. This is all a part of the right of dissent which must
be preserved for our people. But the question arises whether an individual who
does not accept and abide by the security system should be a part of it.
In this connection, we should
acknowledge that in the early war years very few people were aware of the full
implications of security or security measures which needed to be undertaken.
Even many of those in the military services found themselves for a time in a
new field. This was a new concept under strange and alien pressures. We believe
that no person should now be held accountable for lack of full knowledgeability
in the early years of the war. However, those who have been associated with it
during the war years and subsequently and who have been exposed repeatedly to
security measures, should not fail to understand the need for their full
support of the system.
Another major question posed by these
proceedings is whether we should take Calculated risks where the national
security is involved
It has been urged upon us that where
there is lingering doubt about the security status of an individual in the
absence of a finding of disloyalty or a tendency towards indiscretion, we
should take a calculated risk in granting clearance to such an individual if he
is a man of great attainments and capacity and has rendered outstanding
services.
Within the framework of our national
philosophy which rests in large part upon the declaration that all men are
equal before the bar of justice, can we apply one test to an individual,
however brilliant his capacities and however magnificent his contributions, and
another test to an individual with more mundane capabilities and lesser
contributions? In other words, can a different test for security purposes be
justified in the case of the brilliant technical consultant than in the case of
the stenographer or clerk? It seems to us that such a distinction can be
justified only on the ground of critical national need and that otherwise there
can be but one standard for all.
We acknowledge that the national
necessity may at times require the taking of a calculated risk. Such a
calculated risk was taken in the employment and retention of Dr. Oppenheimer as
Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory during the war years, on the ground of
the overriding need for his services. The officer-in-charge has said that, had
he found the risk becoming a danger, he would have felt impelled to open up the
whole project and throw security to the winds rather than lose the talents of
the individual. Again, wartime exigencies demanded the use of Nazi scientists
before the issues with Germany were settled.
What we have learned in this inquiry
makes the present application of this principle inappropriate in the instant
case. Notwithstanding the undoubted and unparalleled contributions of Dr.
Oppenheimer to the atomic energy program, it appears that his services as a
consultant were used by the Atomic Energy Commission during the entire year of
1953 for a period approximating only 21/2 days' time. We conclude, therefore,
that our recommendation should not be based upon such principle, overriding all
other considerations.
Another major issue which has been
highlighted by this inquiry is whether a moral principle akin to double
jeopardy in the traditional legal sense should have a place in the
jurisprudence of security
We properly ask ourselves the question:
How many times may the same circumstances of a man's life be examined with a
view toward determination of his security status? Once a responsible agency of
the Government has made an evaluation, should this not be a bar to later and
similar consideration by the same or another agency in the absence of newly
discovered evidence or developments. This is an important consideration and the
Board has undertaken to examine it with care.
It must be made clear to the public by
the Government that its employees and consultants are not to be subject to
repeated and capricious reviews of their loyalty or security status. In
general, this Board believes that responsible prior clearance should be given
great weight and should be virtually considered a settled matter in cases where
there is manifestly no new material or developments of consequence. We would
not urge this as an absolute principle, however, for the reason that the
criminal law concept referred to is for the protection of the individual
whereas security measures are for the protection of the country, whose
interests should never be foreclosed.
There seems to be a widespread view that
such a principle should apply in the case at hand. It has been suggested that
the clearance by the Manhattan Engineering District and the subsequent action
of the AEC in 1947 should be controlling. We believe this not to be sound.
In the first place, we must acknowledge
the important difference between an administrative review of files not
involving the personal appearance of the employee and of which he is probably
not aware, and a hearing before the Board at which the employee appears and at
which testimony is taken. This is the first occasion of review of this case by
a Personnel Security Board. Indeed, this is the only time that all of the
available evidence regarding Dr. Oppenheimer has been correlated and presented
in a package. This latter fact suggests the second reason why Dr. Oppenheimer
is not being placed in double jeopardy in a moral sense by this proceeding. It
was necessary to the national security that material information not considered
in previous clearances be studied.
Third, new developments have occurred
since the granting of previous clearances. Among these are changed national and
international circumstances and new security standards and criteria which have
been published in the interim. We refer specifically to the AEC criteria
published since 1947 and the Executive order of the President of April 27,
1953.
It must be recalled that the Manhattan
District criteria were primarily loyalty and discretion. Such records as are
available with respect to the AEC clearance in 1947 indicate that in general it
was based in large part upon the earlier clearance by the Manhattan Engineering
District, upon a finding of loyal service to the country, and the risk to the
program in the loss of services of the individual.
Fourth, viewed against the background of
earlier history, the conduct of the individual subsequently to 1947 has been
such as to raise questions of security risk.
Another major issue prompted by these
proceedings concerns itself with the extent of the right of a citizen, to
continued employment by his Government because of loyal and distinguished
accomplishment in Government service
There are those who seem deeply
convinced that Dr. Oppenheimer has a right to continued employment, in view of
his previous contributions and in the light of his brilliant capabilities.
Citizens of this country have many inalienable rights, but it is clear that
Government service is a privilege and not a right. This principle was simply,
but effectively, stated by Oliver Wendell Holmes:
"* * * The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman * * *"
We deem it, therefore, to be within the
power of Government in the absence of Civil Service requirement or contractual
relationships to terminate employment of a consultant at any time.
A major question which has repeatedly
emerged in our deliberations is whether in determining the security status of
an individual who is a scientist, the Government must take into account the
reactions of, and the possible impact upon, all other scientists
The Board takes cognizance of the
serious alarm expressed to it by witnesses and frequently adverted to in the
public press that denial of clearance to Dr. Oppenheimer would do serious harm
in the scientific community. This is a matter of vital concern to the
Government and the people.
We should express our considered view
that, because the loyalty or security risk status of a scientist or any other
intellectual may be brought into question, scientists and intellectuals, are
ill-advised to assert that a reasonable and sane inquiry constitutes an attack
upon scientists and intellectuals generally. This Board would deplore deeply
any notion that scientists are under attack in this country and that prudent
study of any individual's conduct and character within the necessary demands of
the national security could be either in fact or in appearance a reflection of
anti-intellectualism.
The Board has taken note of the fact
that in some cases of this sort groups of scientists have tended toward an
almost professional opposition to any inquiry about a member of the group. They
thus, by moving in a body to the defense of one of their number, give currency,
credence, and support to a notion that they as a group are under attack. A
decision of a Board of this sort, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
individual whose case is before it, should be considered neither as an
exoneration of all scientists from imputations of security risk nor a
determination that all scientists are suspect.
We know that scientists, with their
unusual talents, are loyal citizens, and, for every pertinent purpose, normal
human beings. We must believe that they the young and the old and all between,
will understand that a responsible Government must make responsible decisions.
If scientists should believe that such a decision in Government, however
distasteful with respect to an individual, must be applicable to his whole
profession, they misapprehended their own duties and obligations as citizens.
In this connection, the Board has been
impressed, and in many ways heartened by the manner in which many scientists
have sprung to the defense of one whom many felt was under unfair attack. This
is important and encouraging when one is concerned with the vitality of our
society. However, the Board feels constrained to express its concern that in
this solidarity there have been attitudes so uncompromising in support of
science in general, and Dr. Oppenheimer in particular, that some witnesses
have, in our judgment, allowed their convictions to supersede what might
reasonably have been their recollections.
One important consideration brought into
focus by this case is the role of scientists as advisers in the formulation of
Government policy.
We must address ourselves to the natural
constraints and the particular difficulties inherent in the AEC program itself.
As a Nation we find it necessary to delegate temporary authority with respect
to the conduct of the program and the policies to be followed to duly elected
representatives and appointive officials as provided for by our Constitution
and laws. For the most part, these representatives and officials are not
capable of passing judgment on technical matters and, therefore, appropriately
look to specialists for advice. We must take notice of the current and
inevitable amplification of influence which attaches to those giving advice
under these circumstances. These specialists have an exponential amplification
of influence which is vastly greater than that of the individual citizen.
It must be understood that such
specialists did not, as scientists, deliberately create this condition. For
example, Dr. Oppenheimer served his Government because it sought him. The
impact of his influence was felt immediately and increased progressively as his
services were used. The Nation owes these scientists, we believe, a great debt
of gratitude for loyal and magnificent service. This is particularly true with
respect to Dr. Oppenheimer.
A question can properly be raised about
advice of specialists relating to moral, military and political issues, under
circumstances which lend such advice an undue and in some cases decisive
weight. Caution must be expressed with respect to judgments which go beyond
areas of special and particular competence.
Any man, whether specialist or layman,
of course, must have the right to express his deep moral convictions; must have
the privilege of voicing his deepest doubts. We can understand the emotional
involvement of any scientist who contributed to the development of atomic
energy and thus helped to unleash upon the world a force which could be
destructive of civilization. Perhaps no American can be entirely guilt-free,
and, yet, these weapons did not bring peace nor lessen the threats to the
survival of our free institutions. Emotional involvement in the current crisis,
like all other things, must yield to the security of the nation.
Dr. Oppenheimer himself testified,
"I felt perhaps quite wrongly that having played an active part in
promoting a revolution in warfare I needed to be as responsible as I could with
regard to what came of this revolution."
We have no doubt that other distinguished
and devoted scientists have found themselves beset by a similar conflict.
It is vitally important that Government
and scientists alike understand the need for and value of the advice of
competent technicians. This need is a present and a continuing one. Yet, those
officials in Government who are responsible for the security of the country
must be certain that the advice which they seriously seek appropriately
reflects special competence on the one hand, and soundly based conviction on
the other, uncolored and uninfluenced by considerations of an emotional
character.
In evaluating advice from a specialist
which departs from the area of his specialty, Government officials charged with
the military posture of our country must also be certain that underlying any
advice is a genuine conviction that this country cannot in the interest of
security have less than the strongest possible offensive capabilities in a time
of national danger.
Significance of the findings of the
Board
The fact referred to in General Nichols'
letter fall clearly into two major areas of concern. The first of these, which
is represented by items 1 through 23, involves primarily Dr. Oppenheimer's
Communist connections in the earlier years and continued associations arising
out of those connections.
The second major area of concern is
related to Dr. Oppenheimer's attitudes and activities with respect to the
development of the hydrogen bomb.
The Board has found the allegations in
the first part of the Commission letter to be substantially true, and attaches
the following significance to the findings: There remains little doubt that,
from late 1936 or early 1937 to probably April 1942, Dr. Oppenheimer was deeply
involved with many people who were active Communists. The record would suggest
that the involvement was something more than an intellectual and sympathetic
interest in the professed aims of the Communist Party. Although Communist
functionaries during this period considered Dr. Oppenheimer to be a Communist,
there is no evidence that he was a member of the party in the strict sense of
the word.
Using Dr. Oppenheimer's own
characterization of his status during that period, he seems, to have been an
active fellow-traveler. According to him, his sympathies with the Communists
seem to have begun to taper off somewhat after 1939, and very much more so
after 1942. However, it is not unreasonable to conclude from material presented
to this Board that Dr. Oppenheimer's activities ceased as of about the time he
executed his Personnel Security Questionnaire in April 1942. He seems to have
had the view at that time and subsequently that current involvement with
Communist activities was incompatible with service to the Government. However,
it also would appear that he felt that former Communist Party membership was of
little consequence if the individual concerned was personally trustworthy.
Dr. Oppenheimer's sympathetic interests
seemed to have continued beyond 1942 in a diluted and diminishing state until
1946, at which time we find the first affirmative action on his part which
would indicate complete rejection. In October 1946, he tendered his resignation
from the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions,
Inc., and he now says it was at this time that he finally realized that he
could not collaborate with the Communists, whatever their aims and professed
interests. We would prefer to have found an affirmative action at an earlier
date.
The Board takes a most serious view of
these earlier involvements. Had they occurred in very recent years, we would
have found them to be controlling and, in any event, they must be taken into
account in evaluating subsequent conduct and attitudes.
The facts before us establish a pattern
of conduct falling within the following Personnel Security Clearance criteria:
Category A, including instances in which there are grounds sufficient to
establish a reasonable belief that an individual or his spouse has (1)
Committed or attempted to commit or aided or abetted another who committed or attempted
to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition. (2) Establish
an association with espionage agents of a foreign nation * * * (3) Held
membership or joined any organization which had been declared by the Attorney
General to be * * * Communist, subversive * * * These criteria under the AEC
procedures establish a presumption of security risk.
The Board believes, however, that there
is no indication of disloyalty on the part of Dr. Oppenheimer by reason of any
present Communist affiliation, despite Dr. Oppenheimer's poor judgment in
continuing some of his past associations into the present. Furthermore, the
Board had before it eloquent and convincing testimony of Dr. Oppenheimer's deep
devotion to his country in recent years and a multitude of evidence with
respect to active service in all sorts of governmental undertakings to which he
was repeatedly called as a participant and as a consultant.
We feel that Dr. Oppenheimer is
convinced that the earlier involvements were serious errors and today would
consider them an indication of disloyalty. The conclusion of this Board is that
Dr. Oppenheimer is a loyal citizen.
With respect to the second portion of
General Nichols' letter, the Board believes that Dr. Oppenheimer's opposition
to the hydrogen bomb and his related conduct in the postwar period until April
1951, involved no lack of loyalty to the United States or attachment to the
Soviet Union. The Board was impressed by the fact that even those who were
critical of Dr. Oppenheimer's judgment and activities or lack of activities,
without exception, testified to their belief in his loyalty.